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Costes de agencia y el descuento por tamaño: 
evidencia a partir de las adquisiciones
Abstract
Many scholars have found a negative relationship between a firm’s size and its value, as measured by Tobin’s q.  This result is 
called the size discount. There are hypotheses about why the size discount exists, but none have been rigorously empirically 
tested. This paper argues that the size discount is created by the inability of shareholders to minimize agency costs in larger 
companies. Statistical tests suggest that the size discount only appears in large firms with managers that impose excessive 
agency costs upon their shareholders. Empiricists who use Tobin’s q to proxy for growth opportunities may need a different 
proxy. 
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Resumen
Muchos académicos han encontrado una relación negativa entre el tamaño de la firma y su valor, calculada según el q de 
Tobin. El resultado se llama el descuento por tamaño. Existen múltiples hipótesis que tratan de explicar por qué el descuen-
to por tamaño se produce, pero ninguna ha sido empíricamente examinada con rigurosidad. Este estudio argumenta que el 
descuento por tamaño se crea debido a la inhabilidad de los accionistas para minimizar los costos de agencia en las grandes 
empresas. Las pruebas estadísticas sugieren que el descuento por tamaño solo aparece en las empresas grandes con gerentes 
que imponen costos de agencia excesivos a los accionistas. Los empíricos que usan el q de Tobin para representar factores de 
oportunidades de crecimiento necesitarán un factor diferente.
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1  See, for example, Cockburn & Griliches (1988), McConnell 
& Servaes (1990), Hermalin & Weisbach (1991), Lang & 
Stulz (1994), Agrawal & Knoeber (1996), Yermack (1996), 
Cho (1998), and Daines (2001).
2  See Yermack (1996) and Claessens, Djankov, Fan, & Lang 
(2002). Agrawal & Knoeber (1996) assert that «…growth 
opportunities and q should be lower for larger firms» (pg. 
385).
3  This analysis presumes that all shareholders will bear agen-
cy costs. As Jensen & Meckling (1976) point out, any time 
there is a separation of ownership and control, there will be 
agency costs. In this paper, agency costs are described as 
tolerable if the manager could not be disciplined in some 
way so as to reduce future agency costs.
INTRODUCTION
Many researchers have empirically documented a 
negative relationship between the size of a firm and 
its relative value, as measured by Tobin’s q.1 In fact, 
a negative correlation between size and value appears 
over and over in the finance and accounting literature. 
This relationship has come to be called a size discount, 
because larger firms are relatively less valuable than 
smaller firms. It is one of the most common yet unex-
plained phenomena in financial data. The presumption 
has been that size proxies for variation in growth op-
portunities or systematic differences between large and 
small firms.2 However, no empirical evidence testing 
such presumptions exists. 
The purpose of this paper is to determine what 
drives the empirically-observed size discount. Both 
a review of prior studies and the following empirical 
analysis suggest that the cause of the size discount is 
the inability of shareholders to minimize agency costs 
in larger companies. The evidence throughout shows 
that larger firms are relatively less valuable than smaller 
firms, which is due to the weakening of internal and 
external corporate governance mechanisms as firms 
grow larger.
In order for agency costs to explain the size dis-
count, two conditions must hold.  First, shareholders of 
smaller firms must be able to reduce agency costs more 
effectively than shareholders of larger firms.  Second, 
there must be a significant size discount for the subset 
of firms with high agency costs, but no size discount 
for the subset of firms with low agency costs.3  In other 
words, a size discount should only be imposed upon a 
large firm’s shareholders when an intolerable level of 
agency costs is present. Ultimately, if shareholders can-
not discipline a manager who is imposing unnecessary 
agency costs, the firm must be less valuable.  
The existing empirical evidence suggests that share-
holders of smaller firms are able to reduce agency costs 
more effectively than shareholders of larger firms.  Past 
studies have shown that larger firms are less likely to 
have a blockholder, to pass a meaningful proxy pro-
posal, to have an effective board of directors, and to be 
acquired than smaller firms.  All together, the evidence 
in the corporate finance literature provides ample sup-
port for the hypothesis that agency costs are harder to 
control in larger firms. 
The analysis in this paper seeks to determine if there 
is a significant size discount for the subset of firms 
with high agency costs, but no size discount for the 
subset of firms with low agency costs. Logically, if the 
manager’s interests are well aligned with those of the 
shareholders, then the effectiveness of the disciplinary 
mechanisms is irrelevant to the value of the firm.  On 
the other hand, when the manager has an incentive to 
destroy shareholder wealth, the effectiveness of the 
disciplinary mechanisms plays a large role in determin-
ing the value of the firm.  
The empirical analysis in this paper primarily focuses 
on bad bidders, in the context of Mitchell and Lehn 
(1990). By definition, bad bidders are firms that under-
take acquisitions that result in a decrease in shareholder 
wealth. For each company in the sample, the change in 
shareholder wealth is measured by the abnormal change 
in stock price around the announcement of a takeover. 
Therefore, the sample used in this paper is composed 
only of firms that made an acquisition attempt.  
Bad bids offer a nice starting point because they 
provide a simple measure of the agency costs borne 
by the shareholders. Acquisitions are unique events Offenberg: Agency Costs and the Size Discount: Evidence from Acquisitions 75 Vol. 15, Nº 29
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in that they provide a clear example of how one deci-
sion made by the CEO affects shareholder wealth. 
When a manager makes an acquisition that results in 
an increase in the firm’s stock price, the executive is 
properly fulfilling her/his duties of maximizing share-
holder wealth. On the other hand, when a manager 
undertakes an acquisition that results in a decrease in 
stock price, agency costs are imposed upon the firm’s 
owners. A negative announcement-period return is a 
direct agency cost, because it results in an immediate 
loss of wealth to shareholders and because self-interested 
shareholders would not undertake an acquisition that 
resulted in a decrease in their own wealth.  Therefore, 
the announcement-period abnormal returns that are 
calculated for each firm directly measure the agency 
costs that managers of bad bidder firms are imposing 
upon their shareholders.
  Bid quality is measured within a sample of acquirers 
that made a takeover bid in the period from 1980-2000. 
This sample contains 9,434 firm-years, each representing 
a separate year in which a firm attempted an acquisi-
tion. Firms are split into a high agency costs subsample 
and a low agency costs subsample, as determined by 
the abnormal returns around the announcement of an 
acquisition. The results of regression analysis show that 
size and q are significantly negatively correlated for 
bad bidders, but not for good bidders. In other words, 
a size discount exists for the firms in the high agency 
costs subsample, but not for those in the low agency 
costs subsample. 
A similar test is performed to determine if the size 
discount is as significant for single segment firms as it 
is for diversified firms. The results show a size discount 
in both the undiversified and diversified subsamples. 
While the scale of the size discount is different between 
the two groups, it is negative and significant for both. 
The evidence suggests that this particular systematic 
difference between large and small firms is not respon-
sible for the size discount.  
The robustness of these results is tested using the 
Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) G-Index as a sepa-
rate measure of agency costs. In theory, this measure 
of corporate governance should proxy for the level of 
agency costs within a firm.  The more pro-management 
governance provisions that the firm has in place, the 
more likely the managers are to impose excessive agency 
costs. While the G-index only provides an indirect mea-
sure of agency costs, it is available for more firms than 
is acquisition data. The results of this secondary analysis 
reiterate the prior findings. The evidence suggests that 
the size discount only exists in firms with high agency 
costs. In total, the theory and evidence provided in this 
paper offer support for a size discount, created by the 
inability of corporate control mechanisms to effectively 
discipline managers of larger firms.
This paper is particularly timely in light of recent 
studies. Evidence that managers of larger firms impose 
higher agency costs through value-reducing acquisitions 
comes from Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2004) 
and Offenberg (2009). Both studies demonstrate that 
announcement-period returns are negatively correlated 
with size.  In other words, larger firms are more likely to 
be bad bidders than smaller firms. Their results highlight 
the fact that managers of larger firms impose higher 
acquisition-based agency costs upon their shareholders 
than managers of smaller firms.
Yermack (2006) looks at the correlation between 
the use of corporate jets and the change in shareholder 
wealth. The author describes personal aircraft use as a 
source of agency costs between shareholders and man-
agers, and by far the most costly fringe benefit enjoyed 
by major company CEOs. Yermack hypothesizes that 
CEOs who impose agency costs on their shareholders 
in the form of corporate jets may just as easily impose 
far more damaging agency costs as well. More directly 
to the point of the present study, the author finds that 
personal aircraft use and a broader consumption of 
perquisites increases as firm size increases.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: 
the first section provides a more thorough review of 
the relevant corporate finance literature about the size 
discount and past studies that relate size and the ef-
fectiveness of corporate governance mechanisms. The 
next segment describes the data and methodology of Journal of Economics, Finance and Administrative Science 76  December 2010
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4  See Denis and McConnell (2003) for a thorough survey of 
the literature.
the study. The subsequent section analyzes the relation-




The negative correlation between size and q is observed 
repeatedly throughout the finance literature. Perhaps 
the most widely cited of these articles is Lang and 
Stulz (1994). Their study of diversification consid-
ers over 600 firms in 1984. The result of interest is 
derived by estimating a regression of q on a number 
of explanatory variables, including the ratio of R&D 
to total assets, a diversification dummy, and firm size. 
Their results show a negative correlation between size 
and q: as firms grow larger they become relatively less 
valuable. Robustness of this result is emphasized in 
Daines (2001), who studies the relationship between q 
and the state of incorporation over 47,000 firm-years. 
The results of his regressions clearly show the coef-
ficient on size is negative and significant. This finding 
has been documented in international studies, such as 
Claessens, Djankov, Fan, and Lang (2002), which show 
a significantly negative relationship between size and 
relative value in eight Asian economies.  
A number of authors (Demsetz, 1983) have argued 
that these results may be subject to an endogeneity 
bias. It may, in fact, be the case that firm size and q 
are determined simultaneously to maximize value. 
Therefore, an observed relationship between these vari-
ables may reflect an optimal level, rather than a static 
correlation. Recent studies have attempted to explore 
this potential bias. Himmelberg, Hubbard and Palia 
(1999) use firm fixed effects to reexamine the results 
in studies such as Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988) 
and McConnell and Servaes (1990). Coles, Lemmon, 
and Meschke (2007) reconsider the same literature, but 
specify a structural model of the firm that alleviates the 
endogeneity problem and allows for better analysis of 
the relationship between firm size and q. Both of these 
articles find that size is negatively correlated to relative 
value even after controlling for endogeneity. At least 
within the universe of Compustat firms, there does not 
seem to be an endogenous connection between firm 
size and firm value.
Firm Size and Governance Mechanisms
The purpose of this section is to document evidence in 
the corporate finance literature regarding the ability of 
corporate governance mechanisms to reduce agency 
costs in larger firms.  There are many corporate control 
mechanisms at shareholders’ disposal, should the firm’s 
management begin to impose intolerable agency costs. 
Shareholders may appoint a board of directors that 
exercises more authority over the executives.  They may 
buy a large block of stock, so as to gain greater control 
over the firm. They may instigate proxy proposals, to 
change the governance of the firm. Also, shareholders 
may rely on the market for corporate control to step 
in and remove self-serving managers. An extensive 
literature has documented the role of each of these 
devices in disciplining wayward leadership.4 
Boards of Directors
There is some existing theory and evidence that boards 
of directors become weaker monitors as firms become 
larger. Lipton and Lorsch (1992) and Jensen (1993) argue 
that a larger board of directors may be less effective. 
Both cite various reasons why this might be the case, 
such as free-rider problems, slower decision making, 
less candid discussions, and biases against risk-taking. 
Yermack (1996) finds that smaller boards are more suc-
cessful at governing, as measured by the association 
between board size and firm value. His findings also 
show evidence that as companies grow bigger, boards 
grow bigger. The conclusion that can be drawn from 
his analysis is that larger firms have larger and thereby 
less effective boards of directors. 
The key role of the board is to hire and fire managers 
to best suit the interests of the shareholders. Therefore, Offenberg: Agency Costs and the Size Discount: Evidence from Acquisitions 77 Vol. 15, Nº 29
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5  As of 12/31/2009, the market capitalization of Walmart, Inc. 
was $204 billion, while that of Winnebago, Inc. was $355 
million.
one may also observe the effectiveness of the board of 
directors in their decisions to fire poorly performing 
managers. If boards are successful at disciplining man-
agers, then one should observe an increase in turnover 
following poor performance. Denis, Denis, and Sarin 
(1997) show in their work that CEOs are less likely to 
lose their jobs in larger firms. This can be interpreted 
as further evidence that boards become less effective 
monitors as firms grow larger. 
Blockholders
A number of studies have shown that shareholders 
benefit when the firm has a blockholder.  Denis, Denis, 
and Sarin find that the likelihood of top-executive 
turnover is higher for firms with an outside blockholder. 
Mikkelson and Ruback (1985), as well as Shome and 
Singh (1995), show increases in stock prices due to block 
formations. Mikkelson and Partch (1989) explain that 
acquisitions are more likely to be completed if the firm 
has an outside blockholder. Meanwhile, Bertrand and 
Mullainathan (2001) provide evidence that CEO pay 
is less likely to be based on luck when the firm has an 
outside blockholder. Collectively, these results suggest 
that an outside blockholder can perform a significant 
monitoring function. Without such monitoring, man-
agers may impose undue agency costs upon the firm’s 
shareholders.
Intuitively, one would expect larger firms to be less 
likely to have a blockholder than smaller firms. After 
all, fewer investors can afford to buy 5% of Walmart 
than 5% of Winnebago5. Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) 
provide empirical evidence that the probability of a firm 
having a blockholder is decreasing in the size of the 
firm. In other words, shareholders of larger firms are 
less likely to enjoy the benefits of having a blockholder 
to mitigate agency costs.
Proxy Proposals
According to the rules of the SEC, any shareholder of 
record may submit a proxy proposal to the board of 
directors to be voted upon by the other shareholders. 
This feature of corporate governance gives every 
shareholder a voice in how his or her investment is 
managed.  However, once approved, the proposal must 
be considered for adoption by the board, but they are 
in no way bound by it. As such, there is only a limited 
probability of inducing change in an undisciplined 
management team via proxy proposal.
Bizjak and Marquette (1998) focus on shareholder 
proposals to revise or rescind poison pills. They find 
increases in firm value following adoption of poison 
pill-related propositions.  This serves as evidence that 
the shareholder proposal system is effective as an 
external corporate control mechanism. However, their 
results also reveal an interesting size disparity: they find 
a negative coefficient on the size variable. This result 
indicates that it is harder to pass a shareholder proposal 
through a larger firm. In sum, the evidence suggests that 
the proxy proposal process is an effective means by 
which to cause changes in corporate governance, with 
the effectiveness weakening as firms grow larger. 
 
Acquisitions
There are a number of theories explaining why larger 
firms are more difficult to acquire. Palepu (1986), and 
Baker and Kennedy (2002) argue that transaction costs 
associated with an acquisition increase as the size of the 
target increases. Manne (1965) suggests that antitrust 
laws may prevent bigger companies from becoming the 
target of an acquisition - government regulators have 
been successful at preventing businesses with a large 
market share from buying other firms in the same indus-
try that also hold a considerable market share. Managers 
may also choose to only make small acquisitions because 
they are less risky. Empirical evidence in papers such as 
Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2004) and Travlos 
(1987) has shown a negative correlation between the 
relative size of an acquisition and the announcement 
period abnormal return for large firms. All else equal, a Journal of Economics, Finance and Administrative Science 78  December 2010
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6  By forcing firms to have data in Compustat after the last 
acquisition, data for 289 acquisitions made by 217 firms are 
lost.  Of those, only two are made by companies that are not 
already included in the sample.
7  The key results of this study are indifferent to estimating 
the parameters of the market model with an equal-weighted 
index rather than a value weighted index. Similarly, using a 
shorter event window to calculate the cumulative abnormal 
returns, [-2, 2], does not change the sign nor the signifi-
cance of the results that establish the main findings of the 
paper.
manager is less likely to be fired by disappointed inves-
tors when the firm purchases smaller targets.
Empirical studies have shown that larger firms are 
less likely to be acquired. Palepu (1986), Berger and 
Ofek (1996), Harford (1999), and Offenberg (2009) find 
a negative correlation between size and the probability of 
becoming a target with US-based firms. In a sample of 
UK-based financial services firms, Thompson (1997) also 
finds that larger firms are less likely to be acquired.
Summary
As firms grow larger, there are fewer chances to have a 
blockholder or to be acquired entirely, shareholders are 
less likely to pass meaningful proxy proposals, and the 
boards of directors become weaker. Collectively, these 
findings provide evidence that shareholders of larger 
firms are not able to reduce agency costs as effectively 
as shareholders of smaller firms. This result is necessary 
to support the main hypothesis of this paper, that the 
size discount is a product of agency costs. However, the 
main hypothesis can only be true if the size discount is 
only imposed upon larger firms with an intolerable level 
of agency costs. The remainder of this paper provides 
empirical evidence that only larger companies with 
high agency costs bear a size discount.
DATA 
In this article, agency costs are measured by the quality 
of the acquisitions that a firm makes. To that end, the 
sample in the present study is drawn from the SDC 
Platinum mergers and acquisitions database, over the 
21-year period from 1980 through 2000. In creat-
ing this sample, a number of criteria are employed. 
First, for an acquisition to be a part of the sample, the 
acquirer must be included in the CRSP/Compustat 
merged database at the end of the fiscal year before 
and after the acquisition6. These two years of data are 
necessary to calculate all the variables employed in 
this study, which are described in detail later in this 
section. Furthermore, the total dollar amount offered 
as the purchase price for the target must be at least 
1% of the book value of the acquirer as of the fiscal 
year-end immediately preceding the announcement. 
Applying this 1% relative size screen helps ensure that 
abnormal returns are caused by the event in question 
and not random noise in the data. At the fiscal year-end 
following its last acquisition, the acquirer must have at 
least $25 million in assets, after adjusting for inflation. 
In addition, the acquirer must be attempting to increase 
its ownership in the target to a level greater than 50%. 
Acquirers with primary SIC codes in financial (SIC 
6000-6999) and utility industries (SIC 4910-4940) are 
excluded from the sample. A download of data from 
SDC provides 13,338 usable acquisitions over the 
period from 1980-2000.  
The quality of each individual acquisition attempt 
is measured with a cumulative abnormal return (CAR), 
which is calculated using the market model over the 
event window ranging from five days before the an-
nouncement through two days after, [-5,2]7. This win-
dow was chosen because it has been shown to produce 
significant announcement-period abnormal returns in 
past studies of acquisitions, such as in Travlos (1987), 
Bradley, Desai, and Kim (1988), and Hubbard and 
Palia (1995). The parameters for the market model are 
estimated using a value-weighted market index over a 
200-day window ending six days before the announce-
ment. Firms are eliminated from the sample if they did 
not have sufficient data available on CRSP to estimate 
at least a 100-day market model.
In this study, the quality of each bidder is measured 
by the net effect on shareholder wealth of all acquisitions Offenberg: Agency Costs and the Size Discount: Evidence from Acquisitions 79 Vol. 15, Nº 29
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8  Antoniou et al. (2007) document a sample of 319 serial ac-
quirers in the UK that make an average of 4.39 acquisitions 
attempted within a fiscal year8.  As a result, the dataset 
that is used in the following analysis is composed of 
observations, rather than just acquisitions, where an 
observation combines a year’s-worth of acquisitions by 
one firm into one data point. As such, from the sample 
of 13,338 acquisitions downloaded from SDC Platinum, 
the resulting dataset yields 9,434 firm-years.
Table 1 shows a summary of the sample.  For each 
year, the number of acquisitions, the number of obser-
vations, the average size of the acquirers, and the aver-
age Tobin’s q are reported. The pattern of acquisitions 
over time mirrors that described in the literature, with 
a run-up toward the later end of the 1980s, followed 
by an even sharper spike in activity in the late 1990s. 
There are two important time trends to note here. First, 
the acquirers’ decrease is size over time, after adjust-
ing for inflation. Second, the mean relative value of 
firms increases over time. These time trends indicate 
that proper controls for time must be included in the 
analysis that follows.
The quality of the bidder for each observation is 
measured by compounding CARs from all acquisitions 
made by the firm over a single fiscal year. Compounding 
returns creates one variable that measures the impact 
Table 1.
Sample Summary      
Year No. of Acquisitions No. of Acquirers Mean Size Mean q % of Sample
1980 31 28 21.91 1.34 0.3%
1981 191 162 21.00 1.26 1.7%
1982 242 197 20.68 1.36 2.1%
1983 351 287 20.21 1.52 3.0%
1984 431 341 20.30 1.37 3.6%
1985 259 198 21.08 1.43 2.1%
1986 334 263 20.89 1.55 2.8%
1987 316 246 20.71 1.49 2.6%
1988 395 312 20.70 1.50 3.3%
1989 431 346 20.30 1.55 3.7%
1990 371 293 20.16 1.56 3.1%
1991 403 325 19.93 1.83 3.4%
1992 520 408 19.72 1.98 4.3%
1993 658 476 19.65 1.88 5.0%
1994 838 617 19.64 1.88 6.5%
1995 968 671 19.77 2.09 7.1%
1996 1,197 781 19.86 2.19 8.3%
1997 1,505 907 19.80 2.14 9.6%
1998 1,453 910 19.90 2.06 9.6%
1999 1,253 844 19.99 2.28 8.9%
2000 1,191 822 19.90 2.13 8.7%
Total 13,338 9,434 20.04 1.90 100%
This table shows the total number of acquisitions made each year; the number of firms that made those ac-
quisitions; the average size of the acquirers, as measured by the natural log of sales; and the percent of the 
sample represented by the firms each year
each. Fuller et al. (2002) document a similar sample in the 
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of the firm’s total acquisition activity on shareholder 
wealth. Therefore, the primary variable of interest in 
much of the analysis that follows is the compound CAR 
(CCAR), where:
CCAR = (1 + CAR1) × (1 + CAR2) × (1 + CAR3) … - 1
where CAR1 is the CAR from the first acquisition made 
by a firm in the fiscal year, CAR2 is the CAR from the 
second acquisition, and so on. The resulting compound 
CAR variable is the measure of bid quality, and there-
fore the measure of agency costs, used throughout the 
analysis. Firms with a negative CCAR for a given fiscal 
year are presumed to have imposed an intolerable level 
of agency costs upon their shareholders, and, as such, 
are labeled bad bidders. Firms with a positive CCAR, 
for a given year, are presumed to be well managed, and 
are labeled good bidders.
Financial and diversification data are drawn from 
the Compustat database. All financial data are adjusted 
for inflation, using 1980 as the base year. Tobin’s q is 
calculated as in Daines (2001) by dividing the sum of 
market value of common equity and book value of debt 
and preferred stock by the book value of assets. The 
quotient is estimated as of the end of the fiscal year 
immediately following the acquisition, which allowed 
for the value of the new entity to be included. To ensure 
that the correlation between size and q is not biased 
throughout the analysis, firm size is measured using 
the natural log of sales as of the end of the fiscal year 
immediately following the acquisition9. 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
This section focuses on the empirical relationship 
between size, q, and agency costs in the sample.                             
Table 2 begins by summarizing some of the more 
interesting features of the sample. The first column 
shows the average size of the firms, as measured by the 
inflation-adjusted natural log of sales. The first panel 
shows the mean for the entire sample, while the second 
panel breaks the sample into groups defined by the 
headings «Good Bidders» and «Bad Bidders». Table 2 
shows that good bidders are significantly smaller firms 
than bad bidders, with the average natural log of sales 
of 19.93 for the former and 20.17 for the latter. This 
finding agrees with past results in Loderer and Martin 
(1997), as well as Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz 
(2004), who also find that large firms tend to be bad 
bidders. In addition to bid quality, there are also 
significant differences between good and bad bidders 
in profitability, research intensity, and the timing of 
their bids. It is important to control for these differences 
when measuring the size discount in the analysis that 
follows.
The third panel of Table 2 also shows the difference 
in size between diversified and undiversified firms. 
The results show that diversified firms are significantly 
larger and have smaller values of q. This suggests that 
diversification is worth studying as a possible systematic 
difference between larger and smaller firms that may 
create the size discount. It is interesting to note that 
the calculated value of q for the diversity subsamples 
reflects the diversification discount. Single-segment 
firms have an average q of 2.15, but the average is only 
1.75 for diversified firms; the difference is statistically 
significant.  
Table 3 presents a pair-wise correlation matrix for 
several of the key variables in the analysis. This offers 
a first glimpse at the correlations that will be analyzed 
more thoroughly later in this paper. The most important 
result to highlight in Table 3 is the relationship between 
q and size. The purpose of this paper is to study what 
drives the negative correlation between size and q that 
has been observed in other datasets, and this correlation 
coefficient (-0.0862) demonstrates that such a relation-
ship exists in this data as well. It is also interesting to 
note that there is no economically or statistically sig-
nificant pair-wise correlation between q and the CCAR.   
Whenever a firm’s stock price varies, the market value 
9  Tobin’s q is calculated with the market value of assets in the 
numerator, so q will always be positively correlated with the 
market value of assets by design. Therefore, using assets as 
a measure of size would be a faulty empirical technique.Offenberg: Agency Costs and the Size Discount: Evidence from Acquisitions 81 Vol. 15, Nº 29
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of assets also varies forcing a change in q. Across all 
firm-years, the value of q does not appear to be influ-
enced by the quality of the firms’ acquisitions.
To study the sensitivity of the relationship between 
size and value, fixed effects OLS regressions are esti-
mated with q as the dependent variable, and size as an 
independent variable. Fixed effects are by firm to control 
for firm-specific variation in q. A collection of other 
known predictors of q are incorporated as explanatory 
variables. The return on assets is included to control for 
any correlation between size and profitability, as dis-
cussed in Hall and Weiss (1967). More profitable firms 
should have higher levels of q. The ratio of research and 
development to sales also serves as a control variable, 
as Kallunki et al. (2009) document a positive correlation 
between the level of R&D and relative value. Palepu 
(1986) argues that measures of liquidity and leverage 
are likely to indicate whether a firm is an attractive 
target: more liquid firms are hypothesized to be more 
valuable and more indebted firms should be less valu-
able. To that end, ratio of cash to sales (liquidity) and 
the ratio of debt to equity (leverage) are included in 




             
Panel A: Summary Statistics for the Entire Sample








Mean 20.04 1.90 1.57% 1.85% 0.0479 0.6043 0.5396 25.6% 9,434
[Median] [19.855] [1.466] [0.55%] [5.53%] [0.000] [0.0553] [0.5508] [0.0%]  
Panel B: Sample Means, Split by Bidder Type
Good Bidders 19.93 1.89 9.64% 2.77% 0.0443 0.4762 0.5415 23.9% 4,986





















Panel C: Subsample Means, Split by Diversity
Single Segment 19.35 2.15 2.38% 0.17% 0.0699 0.7507 0.5002 13.1% 4,651
Multiple Segment 20.80 1.75 0.80% 2.87% 0.0282 0.2078 0.5880 20.8% 3,680
p-value for difference
of means
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  
                 
This table reports summary statistics for the variables used in the regression analysis that follows. Means are reported, with medians in brackets. 
Tobin’s q is represented by the variable q. Size measures the natural log of the inflation-adjusted level of sales. CCAR is the compounded 
cumulative abnormal returns around the announcement of all acquisitions in a given firm-year. The 1980s variable is a dummy set equal to one 
if the firm-year was in the period from 1980-1989.  
The first panel shows data for all 9,434 firm years in the sample. The second panel splits firm-years into two subsamples based on the 
quality of the firm’s acquisitions. The Good Bidders group considers firm-years in which the compound CCAR is positive. The Bad Bidders 
group only considers firm-years in which the compound CCAR is negative. The third panel splits firms into subsamples based on diversity. 
Single Segment firms are those that report one business segment in Compustat, while Multiple Segment firms report more than one segment. 
There are fewer firm years in the third panel due to data availability. P-values reported in the second and third panels measure the significance 
of a two-tailed t-test for the difference of means.Journal of Economics, Finance and Administrative Science 82  December 2010
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firm-years that occurred in the period from 1980-1989, 
as authors such as Holmstrom and Kaplan (2001) have 
argued that there were fundamental differences in the 
takeover markets of the 1980s and 1990s, which may 
have impacted the firm’s CCAR10.  
Preliminary regressions are presented in Table 4.  The 
purpose of this first regression is to document that the 
size discount exists in this dataset, even after control-
ling for common determinants of q. The first column 
shows the expected relationship between size and q, 
with the second column reporting that the coefficient 
on size is negative and significant at -0.066. This is 
the size discount: as firm size increases, relative value 
decreases. The control variables discussed above are 
employed in the second model. Each of these variables 
has a significant impact upon q, but the size discount 
is similar, with the coefficient on size at -0.062. The 
results in Table 4 make it apparent that the size discount 
exists in this sample.
To study whether the size discount varies based 
upon a variation in agency costs, firms are split into a 
low agency costs subsample labeled Good Bidders and 
a high agency costs subsample marked Bad Bidders. 
The results are reported in Table 5. 
In the Good Bidders subsample, there is no size 
discount. The coefficient on the size variable is positive 
but not significantly different from zero. On the other 
hand, a size discount does appear in the Bad Bidders 
subsample. The size variable carries a significant coef-
ficient of -0.095. This is the main finding of this study. 
A significant size discount exists for firms suffering 
high agency costs, but no similar discount appears for 
firms not burdened by agency costs. These results sug-
gest that agency costs may be a substantial component 
of the size discount.
10  Note that the results of all of the regression models do not 
change substantially if the 1980s dummy variable is re-
placed by separate dummies for the early 1980s, late 1980s, 
early 1990s, and late 1990s. The results also hold if indi-
vidual year dummies are included instead.
Table 3.
Correlation Matrix                
                 
  q Size CCAR ROA Diversified R&D/ Assets Cash/ Sales Debt/ Assets 1980s
q  1.0000                
Size -0.0862*  1.0000              
CCAR  0.0152 -0.0579*  1.0000            
ROA  0.0549*  0.1438*  0.0384*  1.0000       n=9,434  
Diversified -0.1537*  0.3581* -0.0534*  0.0351*  1.0000        
R&D/ Assets  0.3031* -0.1689* -0.0210** -0.4176* -0.1421*  1.0000      
Cash/ Sales  0.0270* -0.1185* -0.0018 -0.0483* -0.0422*  0.0599*  1.0000    
Debt/ Assets -0.2872*  0.2851*  0.0347* -0.0301*  0.1822* -0.2396* -0.0463*  1.0000  
1980s -0.1992*  0.1693* -0.0268*  0.0833*  0.1041* -0.0996* -0.017  0.0861*  1.0000
*, ** - Significantly correlated at the 1% and 5% level
This table reports correlations between the variables used in the analysis that follows. Tobin’s q is represented by the variable q.  Size is mea-
sured by the natural log of the inflation-adjusted level of sales. CCAR is the compounded cumulative abnormal return around the announcement 
of all acquisitions for a given firm-year. The variable, Diversified, is a dummy set equal to one if the firm is diversified for a given firm-year and 
zero otherwise. The 1980s variable is a dummy set equal to one if the firm-year was in the period from 1980-1989.Offenberg: Agency Costs and the Size Discount: Evidence from Acquisitions 83 Vol. 15, Nº 29
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Table 4.
Determinants of Tobin’s q      
Dependent variable = Tobin’s q      
  Expected (1) (2)
  Sign All Firm-Years All Firm-Years
Size  - -0.066 -0.062
    (0.000)*** (0.001)***
R&D/Assets +   2.050
      (0.000)***
ROA +   1.932
      (0.000)***
Cash/Sales +   0.022
      (0.011)**
Debt/Assets -   -0.172
      (0.055)*
1980s ?   -0.335
      (0.000)***
Constant   3.234 3.172
    (0.000)*** (0.000)***
Firm-years   9299 8937
Number of Firms   3974 3787
p values in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
This table shows the results of fixed-effects regressions with Tobin’s q as the dependent variable. The two models estimate the 
regression with all available firm-years. Size is measured with the inflation-adjusted natural log of sales as of the end of the 
fiscal year. The 1980s variable is a dummy set equal to one if the firm-year was in the period from 1980-1989. Fixed effects 
are at the firm level.
To ensure that there is a significant difference 
between the coefficients on the size variables in these 
two models, an additional regression is estimated in the 
third column of Table 5 that uses an interaction term. 
This variable is constructed by multiplying size by a 
good bidder dummy, which takes the value of one if the 
firm-year had a positive CCAR. The interaction term 
measures the difference in the size discount between 
good and bad bidders, or how much less a good bidder 
is discounted by the market. The results in the third 
column show that the coefficient on the interaction 
term is positive and significant at 0.109, indicating 
that the size discount is greater for bad bidders than for 
good bidders. In other words, large bad bidders have 
significantly lower values of q than small bad bidders, 
but large good bidders have similar levels of q to small 
good bidders.
Fuller, Netter, and Stegemoller (2002), amongst   
others, show that the method of payment (stock vs. 
cash), the organizational form of the target (public vs. 
private), whether or not the deal was a tender offer, Journal of Economics, Finance and Administrative Science 84  December 2010
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Table 5.
 Agency Costs and the Determinants of Tobin’s q    
Dependent variable = Tobin’s q      
         
  Expected (1) (2) (3)
  Sign Good Bidders Bad Bidders All Firm-Years
Size  - 0.008 -0.095 -0.115
    (0.782) (0.006)*** (0.000)***
Good Bidder Dummy ?     -2.266
        (0.000)***
Size x Good Bidder Dummy ?     0.109
        (0.000)***
R&D/Assets + 2.572 1.589 2.012
    (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***
ROA + 1.904 1.748 1.910
    (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***
Cash/Sales + 0.006 0.008 0.016
    (0.543) (0.800) (0.065)*
Debt/Assets - -0.475 -0.172 -0.17
    (0.001)*** (0.266) (0.054)*
1980s ? -0.307 -0.372 -0.322
    (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***
Constant   1.891 3.925 4.241
    (0.001)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***
Firm-years   4722 4215 8937
Number of Firms   2720 2485 3787
p values in parentheses        
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
This table shows the results of fixed-effects regressions with Tobin’s q as the dependent variable. The Good Bidders column only considers 
firm-years in which the CCAR is positive, whereas the Bad Bidders column only considers firm-years in which the CCAR is negative.  CCAR 
is the compounded cumulative abnormal returns around the announcement of all acquisitions for a given firm-year. The Good Bidder Dummy 
in the third column is a dummy variable set equal to one if the CCAR for a given firm-year is positive and zero otherwise. Size is measured 
with the inflation-adjusted natural log of sales as of the end of the fiscal year. The 1980s variable is a dummy set equal to one if the firm-year 
was in the period from 1980-1989. Fixed effects are at the firm level.Offenberg: Agency Costs and the Size Discount: Evidence from Acquisitions 85 Vol. 15, Nº 29
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Table 6.
Diversification and the Determinants of Tobin’s q    
         
Dependent variable = Tobin’s q      
         
  Expected (1) (2) (3)
  Sign Diversified Firm-Years Nondiversified Firm-Years All Firm-Years
Size  - -0.124 -0.065 -0.072
    (0.000)*** (0.098)* (0.004)***
Diversification dummy -     -1.023
        (0.011)**
Size x Diversification dummy ?     0.046
        (0.018)**
R&D/Assets + 3.117 2.015 2.003
    (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***
ROA + 1.343 2.151 1.888
    (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***
Cash/Sales + 0.073 0.025 0.021
    (0.094)* (0.021)** (0.019)**
Debt/Assets - -0.315 -0.306 -0.304
    (0.026)** (0.055)* (0.003)***
1980s ? -0.297 -0.371 -0.306
    (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***
Constant   4.428 3.430 3.506
    (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***
Firm-years   3558 4316 7874
Number of Firms   1606 2369 3464
p values in parentheses





   
This table shows the results of fixed-effects regressions with Tobin’s q as the dependent variable. The first column only considers firm-
years in which the acquirer is diversified The second column only considers firm-years in which the acquirer is not diversified. The 
Diversification Dummy in the third column is a dummy variable set equal to one if the firm is diversified for a given firm year and zero 
otherwise. The 1980s variable is a dummy set equal to one if the firm-year was in the period from 1980-1989 Fixed effects are at the firm 
level.Journal of Economics, Finance and Administrative Science 86  December 2010
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and other deal characteristics have an impact on the 
acquirer’s announcement-period abnormal return. It is 
important to note that no controls are included in the 
analysis to account for these characteristics of the acqui-
sition. They are intentionally omitted because abnormal 
returns are being used as an explanatory variable. The 
abnormal returns are attempting to capture the change 
in shareholder wealth. Shareholders do not care if they 
have lost wealth in an acquisition because of the method 
of payment: they only care that they have lost wealth. 
As such, including any controls that dilute the impact 




If the size discount is due to diversification in large 
firms, then it should be apparent in a subsample of 
diversified companies, but not in a subsample of single-
segment entities. To test this proposition, firms are 
split into subsamples and fixed-effects regressions of 
the determinants of q are re-estimated, with the results 
presented in Table 6. The first column shows the findings 
for diversified firms. As expected, the size coefficient 
has a negative and significant value, reflecting the size 
discount. However, this is also true for nondiversified 
firms. While the scale of the discount is less for single 
segment companies versus multi-segment firms (-0.065 
vs. -0.124), the significance is still apparent. The third 
column estimates a separate regression, which includes 
all firm-years and uses an interaction term to determine 
the significance of the difference of the size discounts. 
This interaction term, which multiplies size by a dummy 
variable set equal to one if the firm has multiple seg-
ments, measures how much larger the coefficient on the 
size variable is for diversified firms versus nondiversi-
fied firms. It is interesting to note that the coefficient on 
the interaction term suggests that the size discount is 
dependent upon the diversity of the firm. In other words, 
large diversified firms exhibit less of a size discount than 
large undiversified firms, but smaller diversified firms 
bear more of a size discount than smaller undiversified 
firms. In total, the results presented in Table 6 suggest 
that the size discount is present and significant even 
after controlling for diversification.  
As a further test, a diversification dummy was in-
serted into the regressions previously estimated in Table 
5. Again, the dependent variable is the firm’s Tobin’s 
q, and the result of interest is the coefficient on the size 
variable. To be thorough, the discrete variable used 
to measure agency costs in the model in Table 5 was 
replaced with a continuous measure. More specifically, 
the Good Bidder Dummy is replaced with CCAR.  
The first and second columns of Table 7 show the 
coefficient estimates of a regression with firms split 
into a Good Bidder sample and a Bad Bidder sample. 
Size bears a negative and significant coefficient for 
bad bidders, once again indicating the presence of 
a size discount. However, the coefficient on size for 
good bidders is positive and insignificant. The results 
suggest that the size discount only affects the relative 
value of bad bidders, but not good bidders.  Finally, 
the third column reintroduces the interaction term that 
measures the significance of the difference between the 
size discount in good and bad bidders. The coefficient 
on the interaction term is again positive and significant 
(0.097), suggesting that the size discount has less of an 
impact on the value of good bidders than bad bidders, 
even after controlling for the diversification discount.
January Effect
It is widely documented that stock prices tend to rise in 
the month of January. It is not immediately clear what 
affect this phenomenon should have on announcement-
period returns to acquirers, nor to the size discount. On 
one hand, rising prices make targets more expensive, so 
acquirers may be more likely to overpay. On the other 
hand, rising stock prices also make the acquirer’s equity 
more valuable as a form of merger consideration, so they 
may be able to spend less cash to complete the deal. 
In unreported t-tests, mean acquirer CARs are 2.03% 
in January, and 1.16% in the other eleven months of 
the year. The difference is significant at the 5% level. It 
appears that buyers do make better deals in January. In 
order to determine if these deals in January are driving 
the results in Table 7, the regression (unreported) is 
estimated without January deals included in the CCAR Offenberg: Agency Costs and the Size Discount: Evidence from Acquisitions 87 Vol. 15, Nº 29
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Table 7.
 Agency Costs, Diversification and the Determinants of Tobin’s q  
Dependent variable = Tobin’s q      
  Expected (1) (2) (3)
  Sign Good Bidders Bad Bidders All Firm-Years
Size  - 0.027 -0.162 -0.068
    (0.452) (0.000)*** (0.006)***
CCAR ?     -1.546
        (0.104)
Size x CCAR ?     0.097
        (0.052)*
Diversification dummy - -0.570 -1.556 -1.091
    (0.362) (0.029)** (0.007)***
Size x Diversification dummy + 0.026  0.074  0.050 
    (0.397) (0.031)** (0.011)**
R&D/Assets + 2.692 1.495 1.998
    (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***
ROA + 1.857 1.653 1.881
    (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***
Cash/Sales + 0.006 -0.011 0.021
    (0.591) (0.755) (0.020)**
Debt/Assets - -0.645 -0.315 -0.312
    (0.000)*** (0.086)* (0.002)***
1980s ? -0.307 -0.320 -0.302
    (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***
Constant   1.635 5.383 3.423
    (0.022)** (0.000)*** (0.000)***
Firm-years   4190 3684 7874
Number of Firms   2499 2252 3464
p values in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
 
 
This table shows the results of fixed-effects regressions with Tobin’s q as the dependent variable. The first column only considers 
firm-years in which the CCAR of all acquisitions is positive. The second column only considers firm-years in which the CCAR 
of all acquisitions is negative. The Diversification Dummy is an indicator set equal to one if the firm is diversified for a given 
firm-year and zero otherwise. The 1980s variable is a dummy set equal to one if the firm-year was in the period from 1980-1989. 
Fixed effects are at the firm level.Journal of Economics, Finance and Administrative Science 88  December 2010
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calculation11. The resulting coefficient estimates are not 
substantially different than those reported in Table 7, 
column 3, both in size and significance. In other words, 
the key results of this paper are not a by-product of 
better deal-making in January.
A Note on Growth
As mentioned previously, authors in the past have sug-
gested that the negative correlation between size and 
Tobin’s q is driven by a difference in growth prospects. 
One way to test the validity of this claim would be to 
measure q, then measure the change in assets over the 
next several years and see how well the variation in q 
predicts the variation in asset growth. The fundamental 
problem with such a test is the survivorship bias. In 
the present sample, over 23% of firms drop out within 
three years. On average, these firms are significantly 
smaller and less profitable than the survivors, but tend 
to make much better acquisitions. It is difficult to know 
the implications of this survivorship bias, but any results 
drawn from such a sample would have to be interpreted 
cautiously.
A Note on Bankruptcy
Another systematic difference that has been observed 
between larger and smaller firms is the probability of 
bankruptcy. In Ohlson (1980), a logit model is used to 
predict whether a firm will file for bankruptcy in the 
period up to twelve months following the end of the 
fiscal year. In a sample of firms covering 1970-1976, 
larger firms were found to be less likely to file for 
bankruptcy. However, these findings were updated 
in a recent paper by Hillegeist, Keating, Cram, and 
Lundstedt (2004) (HKCL hereafter), whose dataset 
covers the exact same period as the present study, 
from 1980-2000. Their results show the opposite size 
effect of the original Ohlson study. More specifically, 
HKCL find that as firm size increases, the probability 
of bankruptcy increases.  
One interesting test to include in the present study 
would be to determine if the negative correlation 
between size and q is driven by bankruptcy costs. To 
that end, probabilities of bankruptcy are calculated for 
all of the firms in the sample using the updated logit 
model coefficients from the HKCL study. The highest 
resulting probability of bankruptcy for all firm-years 
in the present sample is approximately 16%. Nearly all 
of the firm-years in this dataset have a less than 10% 
chance of entering into bankruptcy in the coming year. 
It appears that all of these firms are financially healthy, 
as would be expected of acquirers. The drawback to 
this finding is that no reasonable tests could be run 
on the present sample, which includes a probability 
of bankruptcy as a determinant of Tobin’s q, since 
bankruptcy is such an unlikely occurrence. After all, 
Ohlson (1980) argues that no firm with an estimated 
probability of bankruptcy under 50% can reasonably 
be expected to go bankrupt.  
Robustness
To test the robustness of the results, a secondary dataset 
is constructed with a different measure of agency costs. 
In this analysis, instead of measuring agency costs with 
CCAR, they are measured using the G-index presented 
in Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003). In essence, the 
G-index assigns one point for each measure employed by 
a firm that reduces shareholder rights. These provisions 
may include poison pills, classified boards, golden para-
chutes, and so on. The more anti-shareholder provisions 
the firm has enacted, the higher its G-index score.  In 
theory, managers have a greater opportunity to impose 
agency costs if they have more such provisions in place.   
In total, scores can range from 0 to 24. Gompers, Ishii, 
and Metrick classify firms with a score under six as a 
democracy, and scores over 13 as a dictatorship.
The G-index data is available for a subset of firms 
in the Compustat database. The score is not calculated 
yearly for each firm, so in missing years, the most recent 
score is used. For instance, if a firm received a score of 
10 in 1990 and 15 in 1992, it is assumed that it would 
still receive a 10 in 1991. Summary statistics regarding 
this subset of data are presented in Table 8.
11   Deals in January represent 8.14% of the sample, or almost 
exactly 1/12.Offenberg: Agency Costs and the Size Discount: Evidence from Acquisitions 89 Vol. 15, Nº 29
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Table 8.
Summary Statistics for G-Index Dataset
 
Year Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
1990 577 9.12 2.92 2 17
1991 577 9.11 2.92 2 17
1992 572 9.10 2.91 2 17
1993 638 9.28 2.90 2 17
1994 637 9.28 2.91 2 17
1995 701 9.12 2.84 2 17
1996 695 9.31 2.85 2 17
1997 693 9.31 2.85 2 17
1998 1023 8.76 2.84 2 18
1999 1020 8.75 2.84 2 18
2000 1110 8.65 2.70 3 19
2001 1089 8.98 2.69 3 19
2002 1449 8.67 2.59 1 18
2003 1406 8.98 2.60 1 18
2004 1535 8.90 2.51 2 18
2005 1319 9.09 2.52 2 18
2006 1375 9.02 2.47 2 18
All 16,416 8.98 2.74 1 19
The G-index scores from 1990-2006 are supple-
mented with financial data from Compustat. The key 
variables, such as Tobin’s q and size, are calculated in 
the identical manner as that described previously, with 
the obvious exception of CCAR. Firms in this alterna-
tive sample are not required to be acquirers; they must 
only have a G-index score12.
In order to check the robustness of the prior results, 
the same tests are run using this new measure of agency 
costs. The regression model employed again uses q 
as the dependent variable, with size and the G-index 
as explanatory variables. The results are presented in 
Table 9. In this analysis, democracies are the functional 
equivalent of good bidders, as they are both expected 
to have low agency costs. Similarly, dictatorships are 
expected to have high agency costs like bad bidders.  
The coefficients in column 1 suggest that size does 
not have any explanatory power with q amongst the 
12  There is not enough overlap between the sample of acquirers 
used in the beginning of the paper and the G-Index sample 
introduced here to combine them into one panel and run 
meaningful statistical tests.
This table reports summary statistics for the Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick 
(2003) G-Index data from 1990 to 2006. Lower G-scores indicate that the 
firm’s governance structure is more shareholder-friendly.Journal of Economics, Finance and Administrative Science 90  December 2010
J. econ. finance adm. sci., 15(29), 2010
low-agency costs sample, the democracies. To the 
contrary, size and q are negatively correlated for firms 
with high agency costs, the dictatorships. In the Dicta-
torships column, the coefficient on size is -0.095 and 
it is significant at the 5% level. These findings echo 
the results in Table 5. It appears that the size discount 
is limited to firms with high agency costs. The third 
column of Table 9 combines democracies and dicta-
torships into one panel. The coefficient on the size 
discount approaches zero, but the interaction term is 
negative and significant. This result again shows that 
size and value are only negatively related in firms in 
which it is difficult to minimize agency costs. Over-
all, the findings from the tests in Table 9 support the 
prior analysis with acquirers. The key result, that the 
size discount is driven by agency costs, appears to be 
robust to the measure of agency costs.
CONCLUSIONS
Over the past twenty years, many papers have been 
published in the accounting and finance literature 
that show a negative correlation between the size 
and relative value of a firm. While it is often assumed 
that the size discount is due to differences in growth 
opportunities, there is no published evidence to jus-
tify why this relationship exists. The arguments set 
forth in this paper establish an agency costs-based 
explanation for the size discount as an alternative to 
the status quo.  
In fact, it is quite likely that the expected growth 
rates of large and small firms are the same. There may 
be large firms with plenty of growth opportunities, such 
as Google, with their ambitions to enter countless new 
internet-based markets in the coming years. Similarly, 
there may be small firms with no growth opportunities, 
such as typewriter manufacturers. Consider further 
that large firms can be viewed as a collection of small 
firms. For example, Microsoft is a company that sells 
operating systems in one market, network utilities in 
another market, computer games to a third market, 
and so on. From this viewpoint, it becomes apparent 
that the growth opportunities for large firms may be 
no different than those for small firms.
This paper argues that this size discount is based 
on the decreasing ability of corporate governance 
mechanisms to discipline management as firms grow 
larger. This hypothesis is supported by both a wealth of 
prior research, which documents weaker disciplinary 
mechanisms, higher agency costs, and lower values 
of q in larger firms, along with the empirical findings 
presented in this study. The evidence demonstrates 
that a size discount is apparent in firms burdened by 
high agency costs, but not in firms with low agency 
costs. It also shows that no similar disparity exists 
between diversified and nondiversified corporations, 
and is robust to using the G-Index as an alternative 
measure of agency costs. 
This article takes a first stab at the hypothesis that 
agency costs drive the size discount, but leaves many 
questions unanswered. Further tests with larger, more 
diverse and international samples are warranted, as are 
tests with improved measures of agency costs. These 
provide avenues for future research.Offenberg: Agency Costs and the Size Discount: Evidence from Acquisitions 91 Vol. 15, Nº 29
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Table 9.
Agency Costs and the Determinants of Tobin’s q -- Robustness Check
 
Dependent variable = Tobin’s q      
         
  Expected (1) (2) (3)
  Sign Democracies Dictatorships All Firms
Size - -0.146 -0.095 0.003
    (0.504) (0.032)** (0.958)
Dictatorship dummy -     0.8
        (0.121)
Dictatorship dummy x Size ?     -0.169
        (0.032)**
R&D/Assets + 1.924 2.895 4.839
    (0.386) (0.023)** (0.022)**
ROA + 0.719 1.161 4.832
    (0.255) (0.000)*** (0.001)***
Cash/Sales + 0.124 -0.174 0.384
    (0.216) (0.282) (0.090)*
Debt/Assets - -4.209 -1.208 -1.877
    (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.001)***
S&P 500 ? -2.153 0.285 0.592
    (0.000)*** (0.002)*** (0.015)**
Constant   4.075 1.786 0.581
    (0.002)*** (0.000)*** (0.092)*
Observations   1020 562 1582
Number of Firms   195 67 261
Number of Years   17 17 17
p values in parentheses
 * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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